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The People’s War: 
A Chronological Look at the Great Patriotic War 






“Glory to the Soviet troops, who hoisted the banner of victory over Berlin!” 
 
Soviet propaganda during the Great Patriotic War was 
necessary to rally not only troops, but also the entire population in 
order to combat the advancing German forces. Propaganda was 
presented in many different forms: posters, music, policies, 
speeches and declarations, and even fighting tactics. Though some 
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propaganda was ineffective, wartime propaganda and policies 
played an integral part in holding the Soviet Union together during 
the Great Patriotic War and had lasting effects on public memory 
of the conflict. 
 
Setting the Stage:  
Pre-War Propaganda and Operation Barbarossa 
 Before Operation Barbarossa began in June 1941, Stalin led 
the Soviet Union in a massive attempt to industrialize and 
modernize the country in order to compete with western capitalist 
nations and potentially fend off any attacks from the West. During 
this time, Stalin also enforced his unpopular policy of 
collectivization and conducted purges against potential political 
enemies and “enemies of the people.” Stalin’s prewar policies 
greatly affected the Soviet Union’s initial response to German 
invasion in three major ways: the military was ill-managed, Soviet 
citizens were already fighting a war of preparation, and the 
collective was emphasized over the individual. 
When Wehrmacht forces invaded the Soviet Union in the 
summer of 1941, it was not much of a surprise that war had come. 
Stalin expected Hitler to invade for some time, which may have led 
him to use Poland as a buffer state in earlier years. During the war 
of preparation, propaganda alerted citizens to be ready “if 
tomorrow brings war.”1 Interestingly, the biggest shock when war 
broke out was how the Red Army responded. Troops were 
mismanaged and many fled when they heard about the German 
blitzkrieg. According to Red Army soldier Samoilov, “We were all 
expecting war … but we were not expecting that war.”2 During 
Stalin’s purges, many experienced officers were removed, and a 
culture of scapegoating and lying developed in response. This left 
                                                          
1 Choi Chatterjee, Lisa A. Kirschenbaum and Deborah A. Field, Russia's Long Twentieth 
Century: Voices, Memories, Contested Perspectives (London; New York: Routledge, 
2016), 133. 
2 Catherine Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, (New 
York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 88. 
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the army with mostly inexperienced and irresponsible officers who 
had not developed the leadership skills necessary to respond. As a 
result, the Red Army was disorganized and scattered across the 
western border allowing the Wehrmacht to advance rapidly, take 
many prisoners, and destroy much of the Soviet Union’s 
infrastructure and supply lines. 
 Despite the Red Army’s striking losses, many Soviet citizens, 
men and women, patriotically enlisting in the Red Army to 
respond to the imminent, threat largely thanks to the emphasis on 
the collective and the war of preparation. A secret police report 
noted, “The workers feel a profound patriotism. There have been 
significant numbers of applications to join the army from young 
people from the cities and the farms.”3 It is important to note that 
many of these enthusiastic volunteers were often ethnically 
Russian. Many ethnic minorities, such as Ukrainian nationalists, 
saw the German invasion as a chance to escape Soviet 
collectivization, and often welcomed German soldiers early on. 
This is not meant to diminish the role ethnic minorities played in 
the Great Patriotic War, but to show that not everyone was 
enthusiastic about joining the Red Army. 
 As a result of Stalin’s pre-war purges, collectivization, and 
the state’s brutal emphasis on the war of preparation, the Soviet 
Union suffered major tactical losses when the Germans invaded. 
At the same time many citizens seemed to experience a sudden 
surge of patriotism despite the demoralizing defeat. Years of 
exposure to collective Stalinist propaganda seemed to train scared 
citizens to look to Stalin for leadership and work harder to defend 
their motherland against the Soviet Union’s arch-nemesis, fascist 
Germany. Even so, much of the Red Army had lost its morale and 
the Soviet Union was left in shock as German troops rapidly 
gained more ground. 
 
 
                                                          
3 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 88. 
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Repairing the Broken Propaganda Machine of 1941 
 Although there was a notable movement towards greater 
participation in the war by citizens, early Soviet propaganda 
seemed to be ineffective in conjuring much of this support. At the 
time, Soviet propaganda generally consisted of calling for defense 
of the Soviet Union and obedience to Stalin – the kind of 
propaganda citizens were used to hearing. In fact, many Red Army 
troops and civilians had grown skeptical of state reports on the war 
because they had already lost trust in the state due to the paranoia 
of the purges and forced collectivization. Instead of fighting 
explicitly for the Soviet Union or for Stalin, many soldiers often 
fought out of fear of execution by a politruk or the NKVD, anger at 
the world, the need to prove their masculinity, or for the love of 
their hometown. Many Red Army troops also chose to fight to the 
death instead of being taken captive after hearing about the fates of 
the Wehrmacht’s prisoners.4 At the time, state propaganda did not 
address these motives for fighting and its propaganda often did not 
have the desired effect. Outside of state propaganda, a tactic that 
did work for boosting troop morale was their signature “Urah!” 
shout during charges. This not only struck fear into the hearts of 
the enemy, but also worked to unify and excite Red Army troops 
as they shouted together. 
The state had to reform its propaganda’s focus and strategy if 
Stalin was to succeed in his propaganda war. According to 
Merridale, “Over a thousand writers and artists joined the 
campaign to report [on] the front … Their work was controlled by 
yet another new body, the Sovinformburo.”5 The state soon learned 
their overuse of terror was losing its effectiveness. Though many 
troops still fought fearing punishment, others simply did not care 
as they already considered themselves dead. Early on, many 
officers either refused to execute soldiers out of fear of losing 
numbers or executed too many soldiers which brought Red Army 
                                                          
4 Chatterjee, Russia's Long Twentieth Century: Voices, Memories, Contested 
Perspectives, 137. 
5 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 189. 
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morale to a dangerous low. As a result, the state focused more on 
building their troops’ morale up instead of forcing them into battle. 
Much of this reform came from loosening Stalin’s grip on military 
leaders (something Hitler could have learned from) and increasing 
freedoms in general. By granting military leaders more autonomy, 
they were able to better execute their own strategies without being 
micromanaged directly by Stalin and the state. In a sense, this 
allowed “the experts” to handle their affairs more effectively. 
Much of the Red Army’s morale was also boosted when they were 
allowed to worship and even receive religious blessings.6 For 
many, this increase in freedoms signaled that perhaps the state 
would end collectivization in due time. Regardless of when 
collectivization would end, this brought more hope to Soviet 
civilians and Red Army troops. 
In addition to loosening Stalin’s grip, Soviet propaganda 
began emphasizing the Motherland over the Soviet Union and 
Stalin. This was the start of the Russian-centric image of the Soviet 
Union that would prioritize stories of pre-Bolshevik and Russian 
Civil War heroics and continue to grow in the post-war years. The 
use of “Motherland” is strategically interesting because “calling 
her children to war, rodina-mat’ stood on the blurred border 
between spontaneous defense of home and family and obedient 
service to the Stalinist state.”7 Essentially, by creating a parental 
figure (rodina-mat’) to represent the Soviet Union, Father Stalin 
could indirectly manipulate citizens to sacrifice for the 
Motherland. To represent a more aggressive nationalism, slogans 
like Pravda’s masthead, “Proletarians of all lands, unite!” were 
changed to “Death to the German invaders!”8 Songs like “The 
Sacred War” were also written to emphasize unity in defending 
                                                          
6 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 132. 
7 Lisa A. Kirschenbaum, "'Our City, our Hearths, our Families': Local Loyalties and 
Private Life in Soviet World War II Propaganda," Slavic Review 59, no. 4 (Dec 1, 2000), 
846.  
8 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 132. 
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one’s homeland against the Germans. Author of the song, 
Lebedev-Kumach wrote: 
 
“Rise up enormous country 
Rise to the struggle of life and death  
Against the fascist forces of darkness, 
Against the cursed horde!  
Let the noble fury  
Boil up like a wave, 
The people’s war has begun, 
The holy war!”9 
 
This song reflected an additional focus on stirring up 
emotions of anger and unity against the Germans. Anger, revenge, 
and Russian excellence were also reflected in new military 
machinery. The BM-13-16 multiple rocket launcher was a weapon 
famously dubbed “Katyusha” or “Stalin’s Organ” for the panic-
inducing sound it made and the fear it struck into German troops.10 
The name “Katyusha” comes from the Russian folk song about a 
woman who is waiting for her beloved soldier to return home. The 
Katyusha rocket launchers directly reflected the rage that Red 
Army troops felt towards the German invaders: hot anger loudly 
and chaotically overwhelming the enemy position. Perhaps this 
was why the Katyusha rocket launchers were incorporated into 
Soviet propaganda and became legendary.  
Partisan troops behind enemy lines helped local villagers and 
farmers with their daily work to gain their loyalty and trust. 
Partisans also worked to fight German propaganda by destroying it 
and distributing Sovinformburo propaganda in its place. To 
“remind people of the joys of Soviet life,” partisans would also 
hold party meetings and celebrations. The role of the partisans is 
often overlooked – partisan fighters played an important role in 
                                                          
9 Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to 
Cold War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 159. 
10 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 110. 
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creating chaos behind enemy lines as well as maintaining Soviet 
power in occupied regions.11  
Despite the strategy change in the propaganda war, the 
NKVD still continued to purge potential political opponents, 
defeatists, and ethnic minorities it deemed untrustworthy. The 
propaganda reforms that took place after the stunning defeats of 
the Red Army began to reflect more accurately what soldiers were 
feeling: rage at the German invaders and concern for their 
homeland and families. Regardless of the focus on Russian 
contributions, propaganda attitude and public opinion moved 
towards viewing the Great Patriotic War as the people’s war for 
the homeland. 
 
The Defense of Moscow and Propaganda Leading Up to 
Stalingrad 
As the German Army Group Center approached Moscow in 
the fall of 1941, Soviet propagandists and strategists worked to 
raise morale and support for the defense of the city. Morale 
reached a dangerous low as Red Army troops continued to give 
ground to the Wehrmacht. Much of the Soviet Union expected a 
bloody defeat as the Germans approached Moscow. Leningrad was 
already under siege and suffering greatly, and now Moscow was 
next. As troops were rallied to defend Moscow, many citizens in 
the area were also conscripted to build city defenses such as 
trenches and tank traps. Some citizens volunteered to join the 
Narodnoe Opolcheniye hoping to quickly deter the Germans. Yet 
due to low morale, some citizens did not jump at the opportunity to 
do this, so the NKVD used force to coerce participation. Though 
NKVD coercion seemed to contradict the loosening of the state’s 
grip, it remained constant throughout the war. Regardless, having 
citizens working side by side to defend their capital certainly 
reinforced the concept that this was a people’s war. Stalin himself 
remained in Moscow during the defense, “rekindling many 
                                                          
11 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 144. 
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people’s hope.”12 Having the leader of the Soviet Union remain 
with his people to defend Moscow, showed Stalin in a new light – 
certainly a more positive light than during the 1930s. In addition to 
these efforts to defend Moscow, Stalin learned that Japan was not 
interested in fighting a war with the Soviet Union which allowed 
him to call in reinforcements from eastern regions. Regardless of 
individual motivations for fighting, the fact that the capital was 
under attack contributed to both Red Army morale and citizens’ 
participation. The defense of Moscow was not only a key event in 
the war, but also one in which the Soviet Union decisively changed 
its style of propaganda to one reflecting the idea of a people’s war 
instead of Stalin’s war and focused more on cultivating emotions 
of rage towards the Germans. 
Moscow’s defense through the muddy and icy winter of 
1941-1942 was used as a massive morale booster for the Soviet 
people. State propagandists did not let this opportunity go to waste 
and took full advantage of the pride in defending the capital of the 
Motherland. Indeed, “many military historians consider the 
German retreat from Moscow – just days before the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor – the turning point of the war.”13 By the 
summer of 1942, the Germans were gaining substantial ground in 
the south near the Caucasus oil fields and by Stalingrad. State 
propaganda had a greater sense of urgency that could be noticed in 
Stalin’s public speeches. In July of 1942, Stalin released his famed 
Order No. 227 which said, “Every officer, every soldier and 
political worker must understand that our resources are not 
limitless. The territory of the Soviet state is not just desert, it is 
people – workers, peasants, intellectuals, our fathers, our mothers, 
wives, brothers, and children.”14 The urgency and frankness of the 
General Secretary’s words played to soldiers’ and civilians’ 
concerns about their families and hometowns. It personified the 
                                                          
12 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 119. 
13 Chatterjee, Russia's Long Twentieth Century: Voices, Memories, Contested 
Perspectives, 133. 
14 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 155. 
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vast expanses of territory that had become occupied by the German 
invaders. He continued by announcing the disciplining of troops, 
which was famously summarized into the slogan “Not a step 
back!”15 Though this is now an incredibly famous order, many Red 
Army troops felt that it was repetitive and stated the obvious. 
However, by Stalin explicitly calling for no retreats, it instilled a 
new degree of confidence in many Red Army troops as they felt 
that Stalin himself was urging them to fight for the Motherland, 
especially after Moscow. In a way, the Father of the Soviet Union 
was saying, “This is it, make it count.” This policy acted very 
effectively as propaganda to tie the Soviet Union together leading 
up to the Battle of Stalingrad and onward.  
At about the same time, Red Army troops had begun to 
develop a new sense of professionalism, which was recognized by 
the state and publicized to the populace via propaganda, public art, 
and new medals. Perhaps this professionalism was due to the large 
numbers of defeats or the relaxing of Stalin’s and politruks’ control 
over military strategic affairs. Troops and their leaders now began 
to function more as resourceful and “self-reliant fighters.”16 As a 
result, troops took more pride in their skills as they were rewarded 
for proficiencies and not political allegiances. Military leaders 
were no longer kept on such short a leash and were able to conduct 
operations the way they saw fit (with of course, no retreating). 
Encouragement for this way of thinking was expressed not only in 
the Red Army, but also in propagandized public art, such as the 
play Front! by Aleksandr Korneichuk. A review of the play said 
that it showed how “nothing in the Soviet land will sustain an 
ignorant or unskilled leader – not the personal courage, not honors 
from the past.”17 The play echoed the attitude of the Red Army and 
spread the spirit of pride in one’s work to the rest of the Soviet 
Union.  
                                                          
15 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 156. 
16 Chatterjee, Russia's Long Twentieth Century: Voices, Memories, Contested 
Perspectives, 138. 
17 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 161. 
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Similar to the Red Army’s focus on skills, civilians might 
have also been inspired to work harder than they already were to 
churn out more tanks and armaments. As a result of the increase in 
weapons and armaments, the Red Army’s confidence was boosted. 
The state used additional methods to improve morale such as 
awarding more medals to Red Army troops in recognition of 
exemplary skills and achievements, and refurbishing troops’ 
military gear. Many women were recruited to clean the soldiers’ 
uniforms and improve the Red Army’s look which also proved 
successful in improving the Red Army’s self-image. As one officer 
wrote, “Nina, don’t worry about our uniforms. … We dress better 
these days than any commander from the capitalist countries.”18 As 
a result of the “self-reliant” fighting style, increase in awards, and 
refurbished image, Red Army soldiers were not only instilled with 
greater confidence than before, but also re-energized in a way that 
prepared them for the Battle of Stalingrad. 
The state also often used women and their stories in 
propaganda to inspire more women to get involved and increase 
civilian morale within the Soviet Union. The myth of a young 
woman named Zoia Kosmodem’ianskaia was featured in Pravda 
for sacrificing her life. The story read, “Standing under the 
gallows, she tries to rouse the villagers, shouting, ‘Why are you 
sad? You should be courageous, you should fight, you should beat 
the fascists, you should burn them and poison them!’”19 Women 
participated in the war far more than just in production or cleaning 
uniforms.  
The Soviet Union recruited women starting in the summer of 
1942 initially as medics, but soon after as pilots, snipers, tank 
crewmembers, and other positions as well. Many women were 
excited to join the front in fighting the German invaders and felt a 
duty to do so just as much as men. While women’s participation 
itself was used as propaganda to improve recruitment and civilian 
                                                          
18 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 162. 
19Anja Tippner, "Girls in Combat: Zoia Kosmodem'Ianskaia and the Image of Young 
Soviet Wartime Heroines," The Russian Review 73, no. 3 (July 2014): 383. 
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morale, propaganda and state policies also attempted to boost the 
morale of female soldiers already serving. Since this was the first 
time such a large number of women served in combat – 800,000 – 
Red Army leaders were not prepared to deal with the different 
needs of women, such as properly fitting uniforms and hygiene 
products. Male troops also had a difficult time assessing how they 
should treat the female soldiers. Bella Isaakovna Epstein wrote, 
“When we arrived at the 2nd Belorussian Front, they wanted to 
have us stay at division headquarters. Meaning: You’re women, 
why go to the front line? ‘No,’ we said, ‘we’re snipers, send us 
where we’re supposed to go.’ Then they said, ‘We’ll send you to a 
regiment where there’s a good commander, he takes care of 
girls.’”20 These conditions often made life on the front lines 
difficult for women which affected morale. One attempt made by 
the state to boost female troop morale was to provide 43 mobile 
front-line tea shops each equipped with hairdressers, small 
cosmetics counters, and supplies of dominoes and checkers.21  
Many women became famous because of their service and were 
recognized publicly, such as the women of the 588th Night Bomber 
Regiment or “Night Witches” as German soldiers called them out 
of fear. Many snipers, such as the famed Roza Shanina, were also 
recognized publicly for their skill and contributions to the war. The 
stories of units like the Night Witches and many famed snipers 
were publicized to increase recruitment numbers and improve 
Soviet citizens’ confidence. Unfortunately, women’s efforts as a 
collective were never addressed and largely omitted from post-war 
propaganda, unjustly erasing their large contributions from the 
Soviet memory of the Great Patriotic War. 
In the period from 1941 to 1943, Soviet propagandists 
learned to change their tactics from primarily employing coercion 
and promoting the image of Stalin’s Soviet Union to building up 
the Red Army’s confidence, stoking their fury, and promoting a 
                                                          
20 Svetlana Aleksievich, The Unwomanly Face of War: An Oral History of Women in 
World War II (New York: Random House, 2017), 191. 
21 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 165. 
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people’s war based on many soldiers’ actual fighting motives. 
Many policies such as the relaxation of the state’s grip, Stalin’s 
Order No. 227, and the recruitment of women were also 
propagandized and played a key role in boosting the Soviet 
Union’s faith in victory over the German invaders. 
 
The Battle of Stalingrad and Onward to Berlin 
 The hard-fought Soviet victory in Stalingrad created a 
massive morale boost for the Red Army and the rest of the Soviet 
Union which helped them drive the Germans all the way back to 
Berlin. After their defeat in Stalingrad, the Wehrmacht ceased to 
gain ground and were now fighting a largely defensive war as the 
Red Army continued to push back with growing fury, supplies, and 
numbers. Soviet propaganda had played a large part in rousing Red 
Army troops’ emotions and pride. The combination of Stalin’s 
Order No. 227, the realization that the Soviets were against the 
wall now, and the re-framing of the war as the people’s war 
worked to turn the Soviets into “some kind of cast-iron creatures,” 
as one German put it.22 Stalin’s slightly loosened grip allowed 
Marshal Zhukov to devise strategies such as the encirclement of 
General Paulus’s Sixth Army within the city. Ironically, Paulus’s 
predicament was largely due to Hitler’s micromanagement of 
military forces and refusal of Paulus’s request to break out.23  
Soviet propagandists also used stories of valiant acts during the 
battle to rouse soldiers’ strength and show the rest of the Soviet 
Union the dedication of the Red Army. One such story told of a 
“man in flames leap[ing] out of the trench … run[ning] right up to 
[a] German tank, and smash[ing] the bottle against the grille of the 
engine hatch. A second later an enormous sheet of flame and 
smoke engulfed both the tank and the hero who had destroyed 
it.”24 With regards to the Red Army’s rage, Soviet propaganda 
                                                          
22 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 176. 
23 World War II in HD Colour, “Ep 4: Hitler Strikes East.” Television Documentary, 
directed by Jonathan Martin (World Media Rights, 2008).  
24 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 176. 
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only worked to stoke the flames that were already present and 
helped it grow stronger. Many movies were made showing 
soldiers’ valiant acts with the press explicitly encouraging the 
killing of Germans. Many poets, artists, and writers also published 
works that depicted Germans being slaughtered and used humor to 
encourage German killings.  
Ignoring the Red Army’s self-developed proficiency and 
existing rage, the Soviet state took credit for the Red Army’s 
successes as proof that those in the Red Army were loyal to the 
Party and dedicated to Stalin. Since Stalingrad was “the end of the 
most difficult period of the war for the Soviet Union, the press 
resurrected the prewar convention of attributing success to the 
party bureaucracy and to Iosif Stalin personally.”25 This shift back 
in propaganda style was the early stages of what would eventually 
become the celebration of Stalin’s victory instead of the people’s 
victory. Regardless of who took the credit, the victory at Stalingrad 
worked to destroy the myth of German invincibility and supremacy 
and reinforced the idea that the Soviet Union could still be 
successful in destroying the German invaders. 
 Throughout the rest of the war, Soviet propaganda worked on 
cultivating the image of the ravaging German and constantly 
reminded the Red Army troops of the atrocities committed against 
their people. It was a propaganda strategy that would begin with 
rage, continue onto dehumanization, and end in the mass-rape and 
murder of countless Berlin civilians as well as any Germans caught 
along the way. Soviet propaganda’s greatest contribution at this 
stage of the war was to strengthen the rage and desire for revenge 
that propelled many Red Army troops forward. Soviet 
propagandist, Ilya Ehrenburg, wrote, “Not only divisions and 
armies are advancing on Berlin, … all the trenches, graves and 
ravines with the corpses of the innocents are advancing on 
Berlin.”26 Images of comrades killed in battle and of mass graves 
                                                          
25 Kirschenbaum, "'Our City, our Hearths, our Families': Local Loyalties and Private Life 
in Soviet World War II Propaganda," 826. 
26 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 302. 
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found on the way to Berlin reminded the Red Army of what the 
Germans had done to them and why they desired revenge. In fact, 
signs in Germany read: “Red Army Soldier: You are now on 
German soil; the hour of revenge has struck.”27 Signs and 
propaganda explicitly encouraged Red Army troops to take their 
revenge any way they liked. This was the first stage along the road 
of propaganda that would lead to the Red Army committing 
atrocities in Berlin. All that was needed to mix with this fiery rage 
was dehumanization of the enemy by developing a hostile 
collective identity.  
While returning to a focus on Stalin’s Soviet Union, Soviet 
propaganda worked to instill a morality that would allow and 
attempt to justify the violence encouraged. Troops were led to 
believe that “a soldier washed his neck to sluice the lice, but a 
Communist was on a cleansing mission that would end with the 
whole world.”28 This language led troops to associate the German 
enemy with lice and encouraged good Communists to cleanse the 
world of such fascist lice. This accomplished two things in Red 
Army minds: the dehumanization of Germans, and the 
collectivization of Germans as a single body of lice that must be 
removed. Therefore, when troops encountered Germans, they did 
not see an enemy soldier or enemy civilian but the manifestation of 
Nazi Germany – the hostile collective identity. This is how such 
savage serial-rapes were able to occur. According to Merridale, “It 
did not matter, either, if the women were young or old, for the 
women themselves were not the main object. The victims of the 
gang rapes were just meat, embodiments of Germany, all-purpose 
Frauen, recipients for Soviet and individual revenge.”29 It was the 
Sovinformburo and Soviet propagandists that helped lead Red 
Army troops to commit these acts. Propaganda images included 
one depicting “a German soldier swinging a baby, torn from its 
                                                          
27 Chatterjee, Russia's Long Twentieth Century: Voices, Memories, Contested 
Perspectives, 143. 
28 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 303. 
29 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 311. 
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mother’s arms, against a wall – the mother screams, the baby’s 
brains splatter against the wall, the soldiers laugh.”30 Images 
stayed in Red Army troops’ minds and justified for them the serial-
rapes as a sort of revenge for what the Germans had done. 
 As Red Army troops stormed the Reichstag, the symbol of 
Hitler’s power, they defeated the defense forces and planted a 
Soviet flag at the top of the building. The next day, a photographer 
would immortalize the moment the Red Army defeated Germany 
in Berlin. Soon after, the Red Army celebrated the surrender of 
Nazi Germany and looked forward to returning home to their 
families as they had all hoped. Many did not return to their 
families for months as they were transported to the East to defeat 
Japan. Whether or not they knew it, their people’s war had now 
become Stalin’s war and the people’s victory had become Stalin’s 
victory. 
 
Post-War Propaganda and the Soviet Memory 
 Almost immediately after the conclusion of the Great 
Patriotic War, Stalin re-tightened his grip on the Soviet Union and 
sent many troops and ethnic minorities he deemed as traitors to 
gulags or had the NKVD execute them. According to Zubkova, 
“Stalin tried … to direct the process into the channel that he 
needed. He removed himself from the society of we, moved into a 
kind of solitude, preserving for himself the right of orchestrating 
the process of marking sociopolitical boundaries.”31 By now, state 
propaganda had shifted back to promoting the Soviet Union and 
Stalin, however now state propaganda promoted Russia and its 
contributions more than other nations or regions within the union. 
Many ethnic minorities such as the Ukrainians and those living 
along the western border were deemed traitorous and diminished in 
the credit they received for participation in the war. Stalin had re-
established his reign, which could be seen in propaganda posters 
                                                          
30 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 313. 
31 Elena Zubkova and Hugh Ragsdale, Russia After the War: Hopes, Illusions, and 
Disappointments, 1945-1957 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 30. 
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that depicted Stalin leading the Soviet Union to victory. The 
concept of the people’s war was dead now and had been replaced 
by Stalin’s war.  
In addition to non-Russians, women as a collective were 
erased from the record of contribution and reduced to just a 
handful of famous individuals. Women were not allowed to take 
part in the Victory Day parades. In fact, the first time female troops 
marched in a Moscow Victory Day parade was in 2016.32 Jewish 
veterans experienced incredible violence and hatred at the end of 
the war. As the Great Patriotic War ended, Soviet views on Jewish 
people took an oddly racialized stance. Many newspapers depicted 
Jewish people with stereotypical body features (reminiscent of 
Nazi propaganda) and a book called Judaizm Bez Prikras was 
published demonizing Jews and spreading the rumor that they 
could not do manual labor.33 Such anti-Semitism grew from the 
Soviet move to not recognize Jews as a specific group that was 
persecuted in the Holocaust because that would promote 
“hierarchal heroism.” Instead the state said that the Nazis 
persecuted all Soviets regardless of ethnicity or religion. Also, 
Jewish soldiers serving on the front lines often hid their identities 
so as not to be immediately executed if captured by Nazis. This led 
many other soldiers on the front line to believe that there were no 
Jewish contributions to the war.34 Soviet propaganda further 
strengthened anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union by omitting any 
recognition of collective Jewish contribution – similar to what 
happened to women.  
Many war crimes were also forgotten with time or omitted 
from the records, such as the mass rapes in Berlin and NKVD mass 
executions near Poland. After they won the Great Patriotic War, 
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state propaganda worked to reestablish Stalin’s sole rule over the 
Soviet Union and establish a twisted racialized communism that 
excluded non-Russians’, women’s, and Jewish contributions from 
the Soviet memory of the war. Instead it was replaced by Stalin’s 
outstretched arm, leading the way to victory. 
 
Conclusion: The Role of Soviet Wartime Propaganda 
 Soviet propaganda during the Great Patriotic War initially 
did not seem to work well, but after adjusting strategies to fit the 
idea of a people’s war, it became more appealing and often 
underscored Soviet citizens’ fears and angers. Soviet propaganda 
and policies, though seemingly ineffective, often painted the 
environment in which Soviet citizens and Red Army troops 
observed and thought about their conditions during the war. For 
instance, though the Red Army was on the brink of defeat in 
Stalingrad, Soviet propaganda managed to instill confidence in 
troops, and Stalin’s Order No. 227 gave troops a sense of urgency 
that this was the “end of the line.” Without propaganda’s focus on 
cultivating the rage of the Red Army and trumpeting the victory of 
Stalingrad, the Red Army might not have made it to Berlin due to 
low morale. Though contributing to the Red Army’s victory over 
the Nazis, propaganda often also had negative implications as well. 
A major example is the level of rage and dehumanization that was 
developed and ultimately culminated in state-sanctioned mass-
rapes in Berlin and other war crimes. However, positive or 
negative, it is evident that the use of Soviet propaganda was 
effective in getting the results Stalin and the state wanted when 
applied properly. In fact, propaganda applied during and directly 
after the war still affects the way the former Soviet Union 
remembers the war today. Though Soviet state propaganda was 
incredibly important, it does not and should not diminish the 
essential role millions of Soviet men and women played in 
defeating Nazi Germany and securing victory in the Great Patriotic 
War. 
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